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The paper discusses the case the reconstruction of Kalamata city, Greece, after the 
-
se, recovery and reconstruction. In doing so, it revisits the concept of resilience as an 
analytical and policy tool. 
-
ruction. The political and economic context in the country at the time was favourable 
to innovative strategies. At a local level, strong leadership at the Municipality played 
an important role together with the availability of external expertise and consultancy. 
Furthermore, the fact that a new and comprehensive general urban plan was in place 
a few months before made possible the key decision to set it as a guide towards re-
construction.
them leadership, self-organization, innovation, knowledge and learning capacity, net-
working and trust, interaction between different spatial and time scales. However, if 
those signify at large a resilient city against disasters remains questionable. 
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Resilience has earned a predominant place in a range of 
¿HOGV VXFK DV HQYLURQPHQWDO VWXGLHV SODQQLQJ SV\FKROR-
gy and economics and is seen even as a buzzword (DAVOU-
DIHWDO7KHFRQFHSW LVXWLOLVHGZLGHO\DQGH[WHQVLYHO\
also in disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. 
 Scholars identify a range of essential qualities in 
resilience, among them robustness, redundancy, diversity, 
HI¿FLHQF\ DXWRQRP\ LQWHUGHSHQGHQFH VSHHG LQ UHFRYHU\
UHÀHFWLYLW\ YDULDELOLW\ FRQQHFWLYLW\ SOXUDOLVP WR QDPH MXVW D
few. For example, FOLKEVWXG\LQJVRFLDO±HFRORJLFDOUH-
silience pinpoints adaptive capacity, transformability, learning, 
innovation. GODCHALK  UHIHUULQJ WR UHVLOLHQFH LQ UHVSHFW
to planning points towards diversity, redundancy, resistance, 
ÀH[LELOLW\DELOLW\WRFROODERUDWHLQWHUGHSHQGHQFHDXWRQRP\HI-
¿FLHQF\,QDVLPLODUYHLQCHUVARAJANHWDODVUHIHUUHG
by SAPOUNTZAKI and DANDOULAKI  H[DPLQLQJ VXVWDLQDEL-
lity at a local level identify diversity, redundancy, self-organi-
zation, memory, networking, innovation, interaction between 
GLIIHUHQWVSDWLDODQGWLPHVFDOHVIHHGEDFNVHOIVXI¿FLHQF\7R
close, 100 Resilient CitiesLQLWLDWLYHVHHVUHÀHFWLYHQHVVUHVRXU-
FHIXOQHVV UREXVWQHVV UHGXQGDQF\ ÀH[LELOLW\ LQFOXVLYHQHVV
and integration as the seven main qualities of resilient cities.
 ,QWKH¿HOGRIXUEDQSODQQLQJDQGFLWLHVUHVLOLHQFHZDV
raised from a theoretical construction to a vision and even be-
came a regulatory tool. Together, the resilience of city in respect 
to disasters is studied (VALE and CAMPANELA,QDQHIIRUWWR
HQKDQFHUHVLOLHQFHRIFLWLHVZKLOHNHHSLQJXSZLWKWKH¿YHSULRUL-
ties adopted by Hyogo Action Framework 2005-2015, UNISDR 
KDVGUDZQXS7HQ(VVHQWLDOVIRU0DNLQJ&LWLHV5HVLOLHQW%R[
In spite of its prevalence in current discourses, the concept 
of resilience still lacks precision and clarity and remains elu-
sive (SAPOUNTZAKI AND DANDOULAKI  0RUHRYHU FULWLFDO
voices argue that resilience as a policy instrument promotes 
neoliberal positions and shifts responsibility for risk reduction 
and management from the state to individuals and the soci-
ety (/(17=26 Ȁǹǿ 526(  O’ MALLEY  SAPOUNTZAKI 
FODLPV WKDW UHVLOLHQFH WRULVNV LVEDVHGRQÄDPDQDJH-
ment system of the vulnerability“; each body is developing its-
elf adaptability to reduce its own vulnerability and in doing so 
affects intentionally or unwittingly the vulnerability of others. 
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GAILLARD and JIGYASU  H[DPLQLQJ GLYHUVH DSSURD-
ches for measuring resilience to natural and other hazards 
raise the question whether “contemporary frantic quest 
for enhancing measurements of resilience may … cons-
titute neither more nor less than the perpetuation of the do-
PLQDQW KD]DUG SDUDGLJP DQG LWV QHRFRORQLDO DJHQGD´
 Given the wide range of approaches to resili-
HQFH HYDOXDWLQJ WKH H[SHFWHG EHQH¿FLDO HIIHFWV RI UHVL-
lience in vulnerability and risk is a challenge and requi-
res deciphering the process of social adaptation. To this 
end, SAPOUNTZAKI and DANDOULAKI  SURSRVH WKH H[-
DPLQDWLRQ RI WKH IROORZLQJ NH\ IDFWRUV DQG SURFHVV VWHSV
WKHVXEMHFWRUV\VWHPWKDWLVGHYHORSLQJWKHSURFHVV
PRWLYDWLRQRULQLWLDWLRQRIWKHSURFHVV
WKHUHVRXUFHVGHSOR\HGDQGWKHZD\VLQZKLFKWKHLUDGMXVW
ment is made,
WKHVSDWLDOVFDOHVDQGWKHWLPHVSDQRIWKHSURFHVV
WKHHQGUHVXOWWKDWLVWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVIRUULVNDQGYXOQHUD
ELOLW\RQ WKHVXEMHFW LWVHOIEXWDOVRRQRWKHUVXEMHFWVRUV\V-
tems.
In this Chapter we discuss the reconstruction of Kalamata 
FLW\LQ*UHHFHDIWHUWKHHDUWKTXDNHGLVDVWHUDQGDWWHPSW
to identify elements of urban resilience during the response, 
recovery and reconstruction phases.  In doing so, we revi-
sit the concept of resilience as an analytical and policy tool. 
Essential One: Organise for Disaster Resilience 
Essential Two: Identify, Understand and Use Current and Future Risk Scenarios 
Essential Three: Strengthen Financial Capacity for Resilience 
Essential Four: Pursue Resilient Urban Development and Design 
Essential Five: Safeguard Natural Buffers to Enhance Ecosystems’ Protective Functions 
Essential Six: Strengthen Institutional Capacity for Resilience 
Essential Seven: Understand and Strengthen Societal Capacity for Resilience 
Essential Eight: Increase Infrastructure Resilience 
Essential Nine: Ensure Effective Disaster Response 
Essential Ten: Expedite Recovery and Build Back Better
%R[7KH7HQ(VVHQWLDOVIRU0DNLQJ&LWLHV5HVLOLHQW6RXUFHKWWSZZZXQLVGURUJFDPSDLJQUHVLOLHQWFLWLHVWRRONLW
HVVHQWLDOV
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The case of Kalamata was selected because it is considered 
DVXFFHVVFDVHDQGDEHQFKPDUNDQGEHFDXVHLWKLJKO\LQÀX-
enced disaster management policies and practices in Greece in 
the following decades.
The context and the city before the earthquake
Kalamata is a provincial urban centre in the southern coast-
OLQHRI3HORSRQQHVH0DSDQG WKHFDSLWDORI0HVVLQLDSUH-
fecture. According to the last population census before the 
disaster, the population was about 42.000 inhabitants. The 
city obtained all the typical characteristics of the Greek mode 
RI XUEDQ GHYHORSPHQW DW WKH WLPH XQSODQQHG GLVRUGHUO\ H[-
pansion of towns and extensive illegal housing construction 
(SAPOUNZAKI and DANDOULAKI ,QWKHFLW\FHQWUHGHQVLWLHV
were high. The infrastructure (sewage system, water system, 
ZDVWH WUHDWPHQW ZDV LQDGHTXDWH ,WV HFRQRP\ ZDV EDVHG
mainly on services, agriculture and agro-industry.  The city 
suffered from economic stagnation, in spite of its rich tourist 
resources and the fact that agriculture and agro-industry was 
a driving force of local development even before the WW2. 
,W VKRXOG EH QRWHG WKRXJK WKDW PDQ\ LQIUDVWUXFWXUH SURMHFWV
and social facilities for the city were foreseen in the Regio-
QDO 3ODQ RI (FRQRPLF DQG 6RFLDO 'HYHORSPHQW . 
Response to 
Kalamata 
earthquake 
disaster of 
1986
 
0DS/RFDWLRQRI.DODPDWD
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In the mid-80s, the Municipality of Kalamata had a strong lea-
dership with a clear a vision for the city encompassing social 
and cultural development and public participation. Moreover, 
the Municipality was engaged in many activities and had ac-
FXPXODWHGVXI¿FLHQWKXPDQDQGPDWHULDO UHVRXUFHV ,W LV LQGL-
cative that the Municipality of Kalamata was staffed with about 
235 people, the Municipal Enterprise of Water and Sewage 
of Kalamata with about 120 people and the Municipal Cultu-
ral Enterprise of Kalamata with 65 people (OASP D
 About 5 months before the disaster, the General City 
3ODQRI.DODPDWD 0DSZDVSXEOLVKHG LQ WKH*RYHUQPHQW
Gazette ending decades of planning efforts. The General 
Plan proposed a change of the structure of the city, allowed 
for a generous expansion of the city and was comprehen-
sive in considering spatial, social and economic aspects. 
 At a national level, the earthquake disaster occurred 
when earthquake protection was recognised as a priority for the 
country (DANDOULAKI(DUWKTXDNH3ODQQLQJDQG3URWHFWLRQ
Organisation (OASP KDG DOUHDG\ EHHQ HVWDEOLVKHG DQG WKH
Transitional Earthquake Emergency Plan „Xenocrates - Earth-
TXDNHV³KDGFRPHLQWRIRUFHLQ,QWKH6HLVPLF'HVLJQ
&RGHRIZDVDPHQGHGVRDVEHDGMXVWHGWRUHLQIRUFHGFRQ-
crete buildings. A proven institutional framework for the rehabili-
tation of earthquake-damaged buildings and infrastructure was 
LQSODFHDIWHUWKHHDUWKTXDNHGLVDVWHULQ7KHVVDORQLNLLQ
Earthquake consequences and emergency response
2Q 6DWXUGD\ 6HSWHPEHU   DW  KRXUV ORFDO
time an earthquake of surface wave magnitude 6.0R hit 
Kalamata city. The earthquake was felt at great distan-
FHV 3DWUDV /RXWUDNL $WKHQV EXW GDPDJHG PDLQO\ WKH
city of Kalamata and surrounding areas. The strongest af-
WHUVKRFN RI 0V 5 RFFXUUHG RQ WK 6HSWHPEHU DW 
 7ZHQW\ SHRSOH  GXULQJ WKH PDLQ DIWHUVKRFN
ZHUH NLOOHG DQG  LQMXUHG OASP  ZKLOH  SHRS-
le were rescued from the ruins.  Many roads were blocked 
from debris and power was cut due to damages to power li-
nes. The earthquake occurred on a hot afternoon in Sep-
tember when most people were outdoors and an estima-
ted number of 15,000 people were on the harbour for the 
LQDXJXUDWLRQ RI D QHZ IHUU\ERDW OLQH WKLV VLJQL¿FDQWO\ UHGX-
Miranda Dandoulaki
72
cing the number of victims (IOANNIDES and DIKEOULAKOS
 The spontaneous reaction of the population was to 
evacuate the buildings and escape to open air as fast as pos-
sible. Thousands of people used their cars to escape from the 
FLW\FDXVLQJKXJHWUDI¿FMDPV+RZHYHUWKHSDQLFIDGHGDZD\
quite quickly and many residents returned to the city. This chan-
ged after the aftershock on September 15th when the uproar of 
the earthquake and the dust from collapsing buildings trigge-
red severe panic the mass escape of population from the city. 
 ,Q WKH GLVDVWHU DUHD RXW RI DERXW  EXLOGLQJV
LQVSHFWHG IRU GDPDJHV RQO\  ZHUH FODVVL¿HG LQ WKH FD-
tegories without any damage or with light damage, while 
approximately 22% were considered as damaged beyond 
repair and 21% seriously damaged (IOANNIDES and DIKEOULA-
KOS  6HYHQ UHLQIRUFHG FRQFUHWH EXLOGLQJV FROODSVHG
 Regarding school buildings, about 70% of them were 
FODVVL¿HG DV seriously damaged or damaged beyond repair. 
Overall, half of public buildings were damaged. Masonry buil-
dings, among them traditional and historic buildings and monu-
ments were devastated. Out of the 200 buildings considered 
eligible to acquire a preservation status, according to a study 
of the Municipality of Kalamata, only 100 survived. The spa-
WLDO GLVWULEXWLRQ RI GDPDJH YDULHG VLJQL¿FDQWO\ ,Q WKH ROG SDUW
of the city 60-70% of the building suffered serious damage 
RUZRUVWZKLOH GDPDJHZDV VLJQL¿FDQWO\ ORZHU E\ WKH FRDVW
 The direct economic impact in the earthquake-
stricken area was high. More than 70% of buildings in the 
centre of the city, where businesses was concentrated, 
were damaged. The tourist infrastructure was severely hit 
DQG  KRWHOV ZHUH FODVVL¿HG DV damaged beyond repair. 
 'XULQJ WKH ¿UVW KRXUV DIWHU WKH HDUWKTXDNH PDLQ-
O\ ORFDO¿UVW UHVSRQGHUVZHUHPRELOLVHG/DWHUDOO ORFDOSXEOLF
agencies were involved along with national services and inter-
national rescue and aid teams. The Municipality was activated 
immediately after the earthquake although it had no instituti-
onal role in emergency management. The Mayor, municipal 
councillors and employees of the Municipality gathered at the 
0XQLFLSDO5HIHFWRU\RSSRVLWH WKH&LW\+DOO ,Q WKH¿UVWKRXUV
priorities were the psychological encouragement of the popu-
ODWLRQDQGD ¿UVW DVVHVVPHQWRI WKH VLWXDWLRQ OASP D
 In the chaotic early post-earthquake situati-
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on, many pressing and urgent needs arose while the pri-
RULWLHV ZHUH GLI¿FXOW WR VHW ZLWKLQ FRQGLWLRQV RI FRQIXVL-
on and lack of coordination between the various players.
 7KH2I¿FHVRIWKH3UHIHFWXUHDQGWKH7RZQ+DOOZHUH
seriously damaged, so their services had to operate outdoors. 
Gradually, all services were relocated in emergency shelter. On 
order of the Head of the Prefecture, the Coordinating Prefectu-
ral Board convened. 
 The Municipal Coordination Committee convened and 
decided to set up Committees to support the activities of the 
Municipality (OASPD7KHVHFRPPLWWHHV%R[UHYHDO
the scope of the role of the Municipality in the harsh post- disas-
ter conditions.
Ŷ8UEDQ3ODQQLQJ&RPPLWWHHŶ(PHUJHQF\5HORFDWLRQ&RPPLWWHHŶ6FKRRO3UR-
JUDPPLQJDQG6RFLDO:HOIDUH&RPPLWWHHŶ'HPROLWLRQ5RR¿QJDQG'HEULV&OHD-
ULQJ&RPPLWWHHŶ&RPPLWWHHRI7HPSRUDU\+RXVLQJŶ&RPPLWWHHIRU0RQLWRULQJ
WKH$FWLRQRIRWKHU(QWLWLHVŶ&RPPLWWHHRI&XOWXUDO+HULWDJHDQG%XLOGLQJVXQGHU
3UHVHUYDWLRQŶ&RPPLWWHHWR6XSSRUW&DPSVŶ/RJLVWLFV&RPPLWWHHŶ&RPPLWWHH
RQ(OHFWULF3RZHURI&DPSVŶ'RQDWLRQV0DQDJHPHQW&RPPLWWHHŶ,QIRUPDWLRQ
&RPPLWWHHDQG3UHVV2I¿FH
%R[&RPPLWWHHVDQGDUHDVRIDFWLRQRIWKH0XQLFLSDOLW\RI.DODPDWDGXULQJWKHHPHUJHQF\SHULRGIROORZLQJWKH
HDUWKTXDNHVRI.DODPDWDLQ6RXUFHOASPD
The activities of the Municipality were taking place all over the 
disaster area concurrently and urgently. With its fast reaction 
the Municipality conquered from the beginning a leading role in 
disaster management.
In the following, emergency activities relevant to urban resili-
ence are presented in more detail.
Emergency shelter 
The intense seismic activity and the instruction to the popu-
lation not to use the buildings, even those without damage, 
led to huge needs in shelter for virtually all residents (about 
SHRSOHIOANNIDES and DIKEOULAKOS7HQWVFUXLVH
VKLSV DQG SULYDWH PHDQV FDUDYDQV YDQV HWF ZHUH XVHG
 About 400 families selected by the Municipali-
W\ EDVHG RQ VSHFL¿F FULWHULD WRRN VKHOWHU RQ FUXLVH VKLSV IRU
a few weeks, while about 1,000 people were sheltered on a 
FUXLVH VKLS IRU WZR \HDUV$URXQG  WHQWVZHUH GLVWULEXW-
ed to individuals by the Municipality of Kalamata while af-
fected families formed spontaneously small-scale camps. 
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 $IWHUWKH¿UVWZHHNWKHHPHUJHQF\UHVSRQVHPHFKD-
nism decided to set up organized camps. Organized camps 
were a challenge both in terms of construction and of manage-
ment. The construction of infrastructure (installation of tents, wa-
ter supply, sanitation, power provision, telephone connections 
HWFDQGWKHSURYLVLRQRIVHUYLFHVJDUEDJHFROOHFWLRQPHGLFDO
care, psychological support, entertainment, food preparation, 
FORWKLQJFKLOGFDUHHWFUHTXLUHGWKHFRRUGLQDWLRQRIPDQ\VHU-
vices and agencies in harsh conditions. Each camp had a re-
VSRQVLEOHRI¿FHUDQGWHDPOHDGHUVZKHUHDVDGKRFUHVLGHQWV¶
committees were formed and camp assemblies convened. 
 Initially, the plan was that the tents would stay 
for three months. However, around 5,000 people were 
still living in tents six months after the earthquake (OASP 
E 7KH WHQWV ZHUH UHPRYHG RQH \HDU DIWHU WKH HDUWK-
quake on the initiative of the Prefecture of Messinia.
Emergency demolition of damaged buildings 
The demolition of some 3,000 buildings located all over the 
city was a huge task and an urgent one, because of the im-
minent danger of collapse. Even more, control over demoli-
tions prevented the demolition of damaged historic or under 
preservation status buildings. The task was undertaken by 
the Municipality and began immediately after the earthquake.
Paving the way towards reconstruction  
)URP WKH YHU\ ¿UVW GD\V DIWHU WKH HDUWKTXDNH ZKLOH VXUYL-
val of the population was the prime concern, the procedu-
res for the establishment of a reconstruction strategy and 
of a medium and long-term reconstruction plan began. 
 2Q  D SODQ RI LPPHGLDWH DFWLRQV ZDV
completed with the cooperation of the Ministry of Environ-
ment, Physical Planning and Public Works, the Municipality 
of Kalamata and a team of urban planners who were volun-
tarily offering consultancy to the Municipality. A week later, 
the Municipality handed over to the National Representative 
at the then EEC a memorandum stating the necessity of a 
program of assistance from the EEC for „immediate“ needs. 
A month later, the Municipality presented the “Program for 
WKH 5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ RI WKH &LW\´ LQ D KLJKOHYHO PHHWLQJ ZLWK
the Ministry of National Economy. By mid- December, EEC 
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decided for initial funding of immediate post-disaster actions. 
 0RUHRYHUDVHDUO\DVWKH0XQLFLSDO&RXQ-
cil decided to issue the pending decrees for the expansion of 
the city as soon as possible and to urgently review the Plan 
in order to take into account the new post-earthquake situa-
tion and the early results of a micro-zonation study commis-
sioned after the disaster. At the end, this revision brought no 
substantial changes to the initial Plans (DIAMANTOPOULOS
 It should be stressed that this long-term outlook is not 
usual and was facilitated, or even made possible, by the early 
decision to set the new statutory urban plan as the guide towards 
reconstruction. A map of the proposed location of emergency 
camps completed a week after the earthquake, demonstrates 
that the Urban Plan of Kalamata was already used as a basis.
 Maintaining a long-term viewpoint towards re-
construction in the mist of the crisis and resisting “rush 
WR UHEXLOG´ ZDV QRW KDELWXDO RU LQFRQVHTXHQWLDO LW HYHQ
brought friction between the Municipality and the cen-
tral administration and protests from the local population.
The emergency phase lasted for about 40 days. Gradually life in 
the city began to take its normal course. The population started 
to use to the non- damaged building. Stores that had not suf-
fered serious damage went back to business. Provision of free 
meals stopped. The roads were cleared from the ruins. City star-
ted to function more normally again, although mostly in emer-
gency or temporary shelters. Industries and many crafts had 
resumed operation. After a long emergency period, the rehabi-
litation began and the main challenges ahead were the restora-
tion of the housing and the revival of economic and social life.
In respect to rehabilitation of damaged buildings, the following 
JRDOVZHUHVHW
7RUHVWRUHWKHEXLOGLQJVWRFNERWKLQWHUPVRITXDQWLW\DQGRI
quality, at least to pre-earthquake levels
7RVXSSRUW¿QDQFLDOO\DQGWHFKQLFDOO\WKHRZQHUVRIGDPDJHG
buildings in order to repair or reconstruct their dwelling and to 
introduce measures for increasing seismic safety of buildings
7RSURYLGHVRFLDOKRXVLQJWKURXJKRUJDQL]HGFRQVWUXFWLRQDQG
self-housing
Towards 
reconstruction 
in three stages 
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Going beyond rehabilitation, the comprehensive reconstruction 
strategy that was developed was structured around the fol-
lowing complementary goals.
Implementation of the General Urban Plan of Kalamata and 
advancing urban planning: revision and implementation of the 
General City Plan, formalisation and implementation of plans 
for the expansion of the city
Housing rehabilitation: repair of damaged buildings (private and 
SXEOLFGHPROLWLRQDQGUHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIGHPROLVKHGEXLOGLQJV
measures to stimulate building activity and social housing pro-
grams, adoption of codes, rules and recommendations to in-
crease seismic safety of new or repaired buildings and public 
works. 
Preservation of the city‘s morphology: rehabilitation of monu-
ments and historic buildings, preservation of the morphology 
RIVLJQL¿FDQWEXLOGLQJVDQGHQVHPEOHVSUHVHUYDWLRQRIWKHKLV-
torical centre of the city, protecting the morphology of the area 
around the Castle
Stimulation of the economy and social welfare of the region: a 
UDQJHRIEHQH¿WVLQFHQWLYHVDQGORZLQWHUHVWORDQVZHUHJLYHQ
to professionals and businesses in the area, additional measu-
res have been taken to strengthen the local market. 
To implement this visionary reconstruction, however, it was ne-
cessary to gain time and release pressures to build back as 
soon as possible. To this end, soon after the disaster it was 
decided to launch a scheme of temporary shelter in trans-
portable or prefabricated dwellings (DANDOULAKI  7ZHQ-
ty two housing settlements with around 3.000 transportab-
OH RU SUHIDEULFDWHG GZHOOLQJV 0DS  ZHUH FRQVWUXFWHG DV
well as 4 commercial centres with 280 temporary units and 
10 schools with 200 temporary classrooms. Most tempora-
ry settlements were located in areas of the city where urban 
expansion was planned so that new infrastructure could be 
of use of the city after the settlements would be dismantled.
Towards reconstruction in three stages
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The reconstruction of Kalamata marked a turning point in earth-
quake policy of the country and became a reference case (IO-
ANNIDES and DIKEOULAKOS ,WV OHJDF\ LV WKHQRWLRQ WKDWD
seismic disaster is not only or even mainly about buildings but 
may generate economic and social development; therefore, it is 
not exclusively an engineering issue and requires a multidisci-
plinary approach and, also, a long term outlook towards the fu-
ture of the city even in the midst of the harsh emergency period. 
 7KH UHFRQVWUXFWLRQ ODUJHO\ DFKLHYHG LWV REMHFWLYHV
(DANDOULAKI $ ¿UVW VLJQL¿FDQW RXWFRPHZDV WKH LPSOH-
mentation of the Urban Plans and the construction of the urban 
infrastructure and facilities that the Plan had foreseen. For in-
stance, a park in the city centre took shape, the East and the 
West centres in the expansion areas of the city were developed 
and the transport network was improved. New economic, soci-
al, cultural and environmental infrastructure such as a marina, 
a courthouse, a market, an industrial park for SMEs, a waste 
SXUL¿FDWLRQDQGFRPSRVWWUHDWPHQWSODQWZDVFRQVWUXFWHG7KH
city‘s morphology was maintained through the protection of the 
identity of the area around the Castle and of the city centre 
and the restoration and reuse of historic and listed buildings.
0DS/RFDWLRQRIWHPSRUDU\VHWWOHPHQWVLQWKHFLW\RI.DODPDWDFLW\DIWHUWKHHDUWKTXDNHGLVDVWHU
6RXUFHM. DANDOULAKI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Moreover, seismic safety of buildings was upgraded 
E\ LQWURGXFLQJ QHZ VHLVPLF GHVLJQ VSHFL¿FDWLRQV
 Even so, Kalamata’s reconstruction had its weaknes-
ses and failures (DANDOULAKI7HPSRUDU\KRXVLQJUHPDL-
ned for 10 years, far more than the two years originally planned. 
In spite of the urban plan and the generous extensions of the 
XUEDQDUHDXUEDQVSUDZOZDVQRWDYRLGHG0DS7KHFRP-
mercial centres created at the Eastern and Western Centre of 
the city extensions were not successful and gradually declined. 
The ring road that was considered as an essential element of 
the new structure of the city was not completed before 2016. 
&HQWUDODUHDVDUHPDUNHGLQ³'NXSGLDJRQDO´WKHXUEDQDUHDDFFRUGLQJWRWKH8UEDQ
3ODQRILVPDUNHGLQ³/WWUHOOLV´DQGWKHH[SDQVLRQDUHDVDFFRUGLQJWRWKH*HQH-
UDO8UEDQ3ODQRIDUHPDUNHGLQ³/W*ULG´OLJKWHUJUD\
0DS7KHXUEDQDUHDDFFRUGLQJWRWKH*HQHUDO8UEDQ3ODQRI.DODPDWDRIDQGXUEDQVSUDZOLQ
6RXUFHM. DANDOULAKI
Still, the reconstruction of Kalamata is a reference case and a 
good practice. As an indication, the city has been awarded a 
price by the EU for its reconstruction.
The successful reconstruction was an outcome of a whole set of 
factors. First, when the Kalamata disaster occurred seismic pro-
Viewing the reconstruction of Kalamata a posteriori
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tection had already become a national priority. The establishment 
of Earthquake Planning and Protection Organisation (OASPLQ
DIWHUDXQDQLPRXVGHFLVLRQRIWKH*UHHN3DUOLDPHQWGH-
monstrated the emergence of seismic protection as a central is-
sue in the national policy agenda. The newly established OASP 
had a multidisciplinary orientation and advanced seismic protec-
tion in Greece taking into account the international trends in this 
¿HOG$QHZ1DWLRQDO(DUWKTXDNH(PHUJHQF\3ODQZDVLQSODFH
However, there was no institutional role for Municipalities in di-
saster management at the time and emergency management 
was entirely in the responsibility of Ministries and Prefectures. 
 Moreover, locally there was a strong leadership 
in the Municipality of Kalamata and the Mayor had built net-
ZRUNV ZLWK WKH FHQWUDO JRYHUQPHQW DQG KHOG VXI¿FLHQW KX-
man resources and means and was actively engaged 
PDQ\ ¿HOGV VXFK DV LQIUDVWUXFWXUH FRQVWUXFWLRQ DQG FXOWXUH
 The fact that the new General Urban Plan was published 
in the Government Gazette a few months before the earthquake 
ZDVDSRVLWLYHFRLQFLGHQFH0RUHVLJQL¿FDQWO\WKHSODQFRPSUH-
hensively combined spatial, social and developmental goals. 
 7KHXUEDQSODQQHUVIURPWKHSULYDWH¿UPWKDWZDVGH-
veloping the urban plans for the city had begun its cooperation 
ZLWKWKH0XQLFLSDOLW\DVHDUO\DVLQ7KHVDPHWHDPSODFHG
LWVHOIQH[WWRWKH0D\HUIURPWKH¿UVWKRXUVDIWHUWKHGLVDVWHUDQG
voluntarily offered its assistance and consultancy. The impor-
WDQFHRIWKHVFLHQWL¿FDQGWHFKQLFDOFRQVXOWDQF\DWWKHWLPHRI
the crisis proved to be essential in maintaining the long run view 
and the spatial outlook even in the mist of urgency and pressure. 
 
The disaster was huge and struck mainly the city of Kalama-
ta. The Municipality of Kalamata played a leading role in ma-
naging the disaster over and above its institutional role. The 
Municipality was even able to guide the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of the city, setting the base for this in decis-
ions taken during the pressing and demanding emergency 
phase. Having built networks, trust and knowhow before the 
earthquake, the Municipality with the support of the central 
JRYHUQPHQW PDQDJHG WR ¿QG WKH ¿QDQFLDO DQG RWKHU UHVRXU-
ces required for implementing a visionary reconstruction. 
 However, the reconstruction of Kalamata constitu-
tes an exceptional best case in Greece. The window of op-
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portunity arising from the disaster and the devastation for a 
short time was used at a local level in order to advance ur-
ban development and sustainability. Although, many efforts of 
Greece cities to recover from following disasters have been 
LQÀXHQFHG E\ WKLV UHIHUHQFH FDVH WKHUH LV QR H[DPSOH RI
such comprehensive successful reconstruction. Then again, 
the earthquake disaster of Kalamata constitutes a turning 
SRLQW LQ WKH HDUWKTXDNHSROLF\ RI WKH FRXQWU\ DV LW LQÀXHQFHG
the management of subsequent disasters. It was an opportu-
nity to test and introduce new procedures, tools and mecha-
nisms for dealing with disasters, to create knowhow and left 
a positive point of reference. Overall, it enhanced the instituti-
onal capacity of the country to deal with disasters and crises.
Reading the case of the reconstruction of Kalamata city after 
WKHHDUWKTXDNHGLVDVWHUWKURXJKWKHOHQVHVRIUHVLOLHQFHLV
a trying exercise. A successful reconstruction in terms of redu-
cing earthquake risk and enhancing urban, social and economic 
GHYHORSPHQWGHQRWHVE\GH¿QLWLRQDUHVLOLHQWFLW\RQWKHRWKHU
hand, the destruction and severe damages that the city suffered 
show low resilience. Therefore, setting a timeframe in assessing 
resilience seems important for the outcome of the assessment. 
Even so, it is practically impossible to distinct developmental 
resilience from disaster resilience 30 years after the disaster.
 When examining the immediate and meso-phases, 
what constitutes an aspect of resilience is the exceptional role of 
the Municipality that overcame institutional barriers and gained 
a leading role in the critical post-disaster period. Accommodati-
on of the Municipality within the emergency response and reco-
very system, no matter the occasional frictions with the central 
JRYHUQPHQWDQGWKH3UHIHFWXUHGHPRQVWUDWHVDFHUWDLQÀH[LELOLW\
and transformability of the formal institutional system. This was 
facilitated by the previous networking and trust built between the 
Mayor and Ministers within the political circumstances at the time. 
 In dealing with the disaster, self-organization, innova-
tion, knowledge and learning capacity were evident throughout 
the period from emergency response to reconstruction. New 
schemes were created in order to deal with the situation; a 
temporary shelter scheme, a scheme for the organization of 
emergency camps, a scheme for the demolition of buildings 
GDPDJHG EH\RQG UHSDLU D VFKHPH IRU ¿QGLQJ DQG DOORFDWLQJ
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founding. The role of the Municipality from emergency res-
ponse throughout reconstruction was itself an outcome of in-
novation and self-organisation, as there was no institutional 
outline of its responsibilities and tasks in disaster management. 
 Strong interaction between different spatial and time 
scales was present and noticeable. A long-term outlook was 
PDLQWDLQHG IURP WKH ¿UVW GD\V RI WKH GLVDVWHU DQG PHDVX-
UHV WR UHOHDVH ³UXVK WR UHEXLOG´ ZHUH DQWLFLSDWHG HDUO\ LQ WKH
emergency phase. Ability to collaborate was demonstrated 
as national, regional and local level entities worked together 
in dealing with the situation. Moreover, the informal yet close 
FROODERUDWLRQ RI WKH0XQLFLSDOLW\ZLWK WKH XUEDQ SODQQLQJ ¿UP
that had elaborated the urban plan of the city, proved highly 
VLJQL¿FDQW IRU HQDEOLQJ WKH 0XQLFLSDOLW\ WR PDLQWDLQ D ORQJ-
term outlook towards a comprehensive reconstruction.
 Moreover, the economic and political context in the 
country was accommodating for a visionary reconstruction. 
:LWK*UHHFHLQWKH((&DQGDSROLWLFDOHUDSURPRWLQJ³FKDQJH´
forward thinking and seeking comprehensive solutions did not 
seem outlandish. Nonetheless, the new approach to recons-
truction was not automatically and effortlessly introduced.
 Examining the broad picture, what is noticeable is how 
good practices from Kalamata were defused into earthquake po-
licies and practices and effect earthquake protection in Greece 
up to nowadays (DANDOULAKI&KDQJHVZHUHLQWURGXFHG
in the institutional framework and emergency plans and know-
how on a number of issues (USAR, emergency propping and 
removal of dangerous elements, usability and damage inspec-
WLRQRIEXLOGLQJVZDVVSUHDGIOANNIDES and DIKEOULAKOS
Learning capacity, memory and knowledge proved to be key 
elements for upgrading the country’s resilience to earthquakes. 
 This Chapter attempted to identify aspects of resilience 
LQWKLVVSHFL¿FFDVH+RZHYHUZHPXVWDGPLWWKDWRXUDSSURDFK
to the concept of resilience remains questionable, so does the 
selection of the suitable qualities of resilience when examining a 
SRVWHULRULDVXFFHVVIXOFDVH(YHQPRUHVLJQL¿FDQWWKLV&KDSWHU
did not manage to provide answers to the key question if resili-
HQFHFDQLQIDFWFRPSHQVDWHIRUWKHGH¿FLHQFLHVLQSODQQLQJDQG
preparedness. In other words, it sidestepped the core question 
“Can we afford to treat resilience as more than a last resort in 
FDVHSODQQLQJIRUGLVDVWHUPLWLJDWLRQDQGSUHSDUHGQHVVIDLOV"´
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